Courts Cannot Compel an Apology in Defamation: A New Appellate Line in Malaysian Defamation Remedies

Authored by Radhia Razali

1. Introduction

A notable development has emerged in Malaysian defamation law: a court hearing a defamation claim may award damages and grant appropriate injunctive relief, but it does not have jurisdiction to compel a defendant to issue a public apology. This point was recorded in the postscript to Wang See Sooi & Anor v Tan Yon Chia, where the High Court expressly referred to the Court of Appeal’s subsequent decision in Tan Sing How & 2 Ors v Ng Ze Xuan, Civil Appeal No. B-02(W)-659-04/2024, delivered on 2 April 2026.

The significance of the postscript is practical and immediate. For years, plaintiffs in defamation actions have often sought not only damages and injunctions, but also orders compelling defendants to publish apologies. The Court of Appeal’s observation now casts serious doubt on that form of relief. The new position is that an apology is different from a correction, retraction, injunction, or award of damages. An apology is an expression of remorse or personal contrition, and the court cannot compel a person to make such a statement.

2. The High Court Decision in Wang See Sooi & Anor v Tan Yon Chia

The underlying High Court case arose from a dispute between the director of a cosmetics manufacturing company, the company itself, and a former general manager. The plaintiffs’ claims included breach of employment contract, misuse of confidential information, and defamation. The alleged defamatory statements fell into two broad categories: first, statements suggesting that the first plaintiff had engaged in tax evasion or fraudulent business practices; and second, statements concerning alleged supernatural occurrences or “ghost” rumours at the second plaintiff’s premises.

The High Court rejected most of the plaintiffs’ claims. It found that the alleged “ghost” statements were, at most, gossip and idle speculation, and that they did not cause measurable harm to the company’s business or reputation. The court held that those statements were not defamatory because they were not serious imputations capable of lowering the plaintiffs’ reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person.

The court, however, accepted that statements alleging tax evasion against the first plaintiff were defamatory because such allegations directly attacked the first plaintiff’s integrity and professional standing. Even so, the court found that publication was limited to a narrow audience and that there was no evidence of widespread circulation. For that reason, the court awarded general damages of RM20,000 only.

In addition to damages, the High Court originally ordered consequential relief. In its conclusion, the court stated that the defendant was liable for defamation in respect of the tax evasion allegation, that damages were limited to RM20,000 because of the restricted scope of publication, and that consequential relief would include a retraction and apology to be published in one mainstream newspaper within 14 days, together with an injunction restraining further publication of the defamatory statements.

3. The Postscript: the Court of Appeal Changes the Remedial Landscape

After the High Court delivered its decision on 17 March 2026, both parties appealed. The plaintiffs appealed against part of the decision, while the defendant appealed, among other things, against the finding of defamation on the tax evasion statement. The defendant also applied for a stay of the order requiring publication of an apology.

The High Court then added a postscript. The postscript records that, after the High Court’s decision, the Court of Appeal in Tan Sing How & 2 Ors v Ng Ze Xuan delivered a decision on 2 April 2026 dealing directly with the question of compelled apologies in defamation cases. The Court of Appeal stated that, in defamation cases, the court does not have jurisdiction to compel a person to issue an apology.

The Court of Appeal also distinguished two authorities that are sometimes relied on in apology-related relief. It observed that Summertime Holidays Pty Ltd v Environmental Defender’s Office Ltd involved a situation where there had been an agreement by the defendant to issue an apology, and even in such a case the court was reluctant to grant specific performance. It also distinguished TV3 Network Ltd v Eveready New Zealand Ltd, noting that that case concerned an order to correct a statement, not an order to issue an apology.

This distinction is important. A correction addresses the accuracy of a statement. A retraction withdraws an allegation. An injunction restrains repetition. Damages compensate for reputational harm. An apology, however, goes further: it requires the defendant to express regret or remorse. The Court of Appeal’s position recognises that the court’s remedial powers do not extend to forcing that personal expression.

4. Why the Distinction Matters

The new appellate position draws a principled boundary between remedies that vindicate reputation and remedies that compel conscience.

A plaintiff who succeeds in defamation may still seek damages. The court may still restrain repetition of defamatory allegations through an injunction. Depending on the circumstances and the way the relief is framed, a plaintiff may also seek corrective or clarificatory relief. But a plaintiff should be cautious about asking the court to compel an apology, because an apology is not merely a factual correction. It is a statement of regret. It implies personal acceptance of wrongdoing.

This is why the Court of Appeal’s reference to TV3 Network Ltd v Eveready New Zealand Ltd is significant. A correction and an apology are not the same thing. A court may be more willing to order that a false statement be corrected, particularly where the order is framed objectively and factually. By contrast, an apology forces a litigant to say something that may not reflect that litigant’s actual state of mind.

The Court of Appeal’s reference to Summertime Holidays is equally important. Even where a defendant has agreed to apologise, the court may be reluctant to compel specific performance of that promise. That reinforces the idea that apology orders are exceptional, if not unavailable, because they involve compelled speech of a particularly personal kind.

5. Practical Consequences for Pleadings and Prayers for Relief

This development should change how defamation claims are pleaded.

Plaintiffs should no longer assume that a prayer for a public apology will be granted as a matter of course. Where an apology is sought, the defendant can now rely on Tan Sing How to argue that the court has no jurisdiction to make such an order. Plaintiffs should instead focus on remedies that remain orthodox and enforceable: general damages, aggravated damages where justified, exemplary damages in appropriate cases, injunctions against repetition, and carefully framed corrective or retracting statements where the law and facts support them.

Defendants, in turn, should scrutinise any prayer for an apology. If the claim seeks an order that the defendant “apologise”, “express regret”, “admit wrongdoing”, or publish words of contrition, the defendant should object that such relief is not within the court’s jurisdiction in a defamation action. The defendant may also distinguish between a neutral correction and a compelled apology. The former may deal with the truth or falsity of a statement. The latter compels remorse.

For settlement negotiations, the position is different. Parties remain free to agree to an apology as part of a settlement. A defendant may voluntarily apologise, and plaintiffs may still bargain for apology wording. The new point is that, absent voluntary agreement, the court cannot compel the apology as a remedy after trial.

6. The Effect on Wang See Sooi

The postscript in Wang See Sooi is particularly interesting because the High Court had already ordered a retraction and apology before the Court of Appeal delivered Tan Sing How. The High Court did not purport to revise the order in the postscript; instead, it recorded the Court of Appeal’s newly articulated position on whether a court may compel an apology in defamation proceedings.

That means the postscript functions as a judicial acknowledgment that the remedial landscape had shifted after the High Court’s decision. Since both parties had already filed appeals, and since the defendant had applied for a stay of the apology order, the Court of Appeal’s statement in Tan Sing How became directly relevant to the enforceability of the apology component of the High Court’s order.

The likely practical outcome is that the apology order in Wang See Sooi would be vulnerable on appeal or on a stay application. The damages award and injunction may stand or fall on their own merits, but the compelled apology is now exposed to a jurisdictional objection.

7. A Narrower but Clearer Remedy Framework

The emerging rule does not weaken defamation law. Rather, it clarifies what defamation remedies are meant to do.

Defamation law protects reputation. It compensates injury, vindicates the claimant, and restrains repetition of defamatory statements. But it does not force a defendant to feel or express remorse. That is the line now drawn by the Court of Appeal.

The rule also promotes remedial precision. Courts can still declare liability through reasons for judgment. They can still award damages. They can still restrain future publication. They may, in suitable cases, deal with correction or retraction in a way that addresses falsity. But they cannot compel an apology simply because the plaintiff wants moral vindication in that particular form.

8. Conclusion

The postscript to Wang See Sooi & Anor v Tan Yon Chia, read together with the Court of Appeal’s decision in Tan Sing How & 2 Ors v Ng Ze Xuan, marks an important development in Malaysian defamation law. The principle is straightforward: a court in a defamation action has no jurisdiction to compel a defendant to issue an apology.

For plaintiffs, the lesson is to frame relief carefully and to distinguish between damages, injunctions, corrections, retractions, and apologies. For defendants, the lesson is to challenge any prayer that seeks to compel contrition. For the courts, the new appellate guidance provides a clearer remedial boundary: reputation may be vindicated by judgment and damages, but remorse cannot be ordered.

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